Nicholas Hadi Saputra 

Department of International Relation, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Jember   

Suyani Indriastuti   

Department of International Relation, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Jember 

DOI: https://doi.org/10.19184/e-sospol.v13i1.60025

ABSTRACT 

Artikel ini menganalisis strategi Uni Eropa dalam merespons dampak ekonomi dan geopolitik chip war Amerika Serikat-Tiongkok terhadap sektor semikonduktor. Penelitian ini menggunakan paradigma merkantilisme dalam Ekonomi Politik Internasional dengan nasionalisme ekonomi sebagai konsep pendukung. Metode yang digunakan adalah kualitatif deskriptif melalui studi literatur atas dokumen resmi, laporan perusahaan, publikasi lembaga internasional, karya akademik, dan berita internasional. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Uni Eropa merespons chip war melalui tiga strategi yang saling berkaitan. Pertama, Uni Eropa memperkuat kemandirian teknologi dan industrial policy melalui European Chips Act, investasi riset dan pengembangan, subsidi, serta proyek produksi domestik. Kedua, Uni Eropa menerapkan proteksi teknologi melalui pembatasan ekspor semikonduktor sambil menyeimbangkan hubungan keamanan transatlantik dan kepentingan pasar di Tiongkok. Ketiga, Uni Eropa membangun ekosistem internal melalui kapasitas produksi, infrastruktur riset, pilot lines, competence centres, dan proyek strategis. Strategi tersebut belum menggantikan pasar Tiongkok secara penuh, tetapi berfungsi sebagai mitigasi jangka panjang untuk mengurangi kerentanan ekonomi kawasan.       

Keywords: Uni Eropa, chip war, merkantilisme, nasionalisme ekonomi, semikonduktor   

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